The finding of increased fronto-parietal activity during conscious and attended perception forms a key basis for theories of consciousness and attention. However, this finding comes largely from studies that required explicit detection of events in a way that made detection the goal of the ongoing task. This is an important confound because goal completion itself elicits fronto-parietal activity. In everyday life attended and conscious perception is instrumental in achieving our goals but rarely a goal in itself. Here we examined whether conscious perception that was instrumental to participants' current goals, but not a goal in itself, elicited increased fronto-parietal activity. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants attended to a stream of letters (1 per second) to detect occasional targets in their midst. We found that consciousness of, and attention to, these highly visible non-targets events deactivated fronto-parietal regions. In Experiment 3 participants heard a loud auditory cue that had to be retained in memory for up to 9 sec before being used to select the correct rule for completing the goal. No increased fronto-parietal activity was observed even for such salient, attended and remembered event. In contrast, robust fronto-parietal activation was observed across all the experiments for goal completion events. The results indicate that increased fronto-parietal activity is not a necessary correlate of conscious and attended perception. We speculate that fronto-parietal deactivation during non-target events may be related to the suppression of potential interference from salient, conscious, but nongoal stimuli.
Introduction
Certain perceptions have a special status. Not only do stimuli induce activity in our neural systems, we are also aware that we have perceived them. One tractable first stage within a scientific approach to subjective awareness is to identify neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), neural concomitants that correlate only with conscious awareness (Baars, 1993; Crick, 1995; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Tononi and Koch, 2008) . NCC studies typically take advantage of situations in which the sensory aspects of the environment remain constant but participants are sometimes consciously aware of a stimulus and sometimes not. Examples include brief masked visual presentations close to the threshold for detection (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Lau & Passingham, 2007) and binocular rivalry (BR) paradigms in which, when separate images are presented to each eye, one dominates awareness at any given moment (Knapen et al., 2011; Lumer, Friston & Rees, 1998; Wheatstone, 1838) .
Q1
In the former, increased frontal and/or parietal (fronto-parietal, FP) activity has been reported for conscious detection versus unconscious trials and, in the latter, for switches in awareness (for reviews see Bisenius et al., 2015; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Rees, 2007) . Such findings are attractive because they suggest possible mechanisms for consciousness, e.g., consciousness of the percept arises from higher level re-representations in FP regions of first order perceptual states in sensory cortices (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011) ; or that it arises from the global neuro-cognitive broadcast of local perceptual information (Baars, 2013) ; or that it arises from a maximally differentiated and widespread activity in an integrated network of brain regions (Koch et al., 2016) . For other views dependent on such findings see Engel and Singer (2001) , Seth and Baars (2005) , Dehaene and Changeux (2011) and Bor and Seth (2012) .
However, it has increasingly become apparent that past studies investigating NCC suffer from many confounds (see also Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012) . The requirement to detect difficult-to-perceive and ambiguous stimuli, and report awareness has a high task demand and requires metacognitive judgment (see Tsuchiya et al., 2015 for a review). Both of these have been linked to increased FP activity. Knapen et al. (2011) suggested that increased FP activity during BR switches relative to activity during the passive viewing of similar transitions, was related to the longer duration and hence greater cognitive demands of BR switches. Frassle et al. (2014) suggested that part of increased FP activity during BR switches may stem from the requirement to report these changes. Specifically, such activity decreased (but was not eliminated) when switches were inferred from optokinetic nystagmus rather than self-report. Nevertheless, these studies could not adjudicate if any frontal and/or parietal activity is necessary for conscious perception (see also Blake et al., 2014) .
A fundamental confound that we consider here is that participants in past studies were to explicitly detect difficultto-perceive sensory events (e.g., masked stimuli, changes in percept during metastable perception etc.): Detection and report was their goal. Goal completion brings with it enormous changes in cognitive control and organization as well as motivational and emotional responses, and is linked with widespread FP activity (e.g., Farooqui et al., 2012; Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009 ). Indeed, unattended and task-irrelevant stimuli presented whilst participants focused elsewhere on a concurrent task elicit activity limited to occipital (Pitts et al., 2014; Tse et al., 2005) or occipital and parietal regions (Scholte et al., 2006) . However, the nature of awareness of such unattended and task irrelevant stimuli would be unclear (e.g., Overgaard & Fazekas, 2016) . Moreover, any fronto-parietal activity elicited by them is likely to be very small, and hence difficult to discern in the context an ongoing task that itself elicits such activity. This makes the null result of these studies difficult to interpret.
Unlike these studies here we looked for activity elicited by easy to perceive, unambiguously conscious, attended, and task-relevant stimuli where, critically, their detection did not complete the participant's current goal. Most conscious perception in everyday life involves easily perceived sensory events that are attended and task relevant, and which are instrumental to achieving a goal, but such perception is not a goal in itself. In addition we are rarely asked to make explicit metacognitive judgments about our awareness. If you are searching through a pile of journal articles to find a particular paper, for example, you attend to other papers (unlike other parts of your desk) and scan their titles but this awareness does not constitute attainment of your current goal. Would awareness of these task relevant, attended, conscious but non-goal stimuli be associated with increased FP activity?
Relatedly, some of the above issues also confound the purported relation between increased FP activity and attention. In the paper search example, each article must be sequentially attended to achieve the goal. It has been proposed that while all sensations impinging our senses reach early sensory cortices, attention acts to amplify and broadcast representation beyond these regions into FP areas (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2006; Duncan, 2006; Miller & Cohen, 2000) . However, evidence supportive of this comes, again, largely from paradigms in which attention and goal are closely aligned (e.g., targets during visual search; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006; Duncan, 2006) . In contrast, many goals require attention to objects and spaces that are instrumental to their completion but which do not constitute completion. Neural responses e and specifically FP responses e to such attended events that do not constitute goal attainment are unclear.
There are, however, some hints. Shulman et al. (2003 Shulman et al. ( , 2007 ) asked participants to view rapid sequences of digits (50 msec/ presentation with an average gap of 72 msec in between presentations) for the occurrence of letter targets. As expected, target detection was accompanied by very widespread FP activity. Non-targets produced mixed findings with, deactivation in some FP regions (e.g., middle frontal gyrus, inferior parietal regions) accompanied by increased activation in other dorsal frontal, parietal regions, and the anterior insula. While this study suggested a categorical difference between attended events based on whether they completed a goal, including FP deactivation for attended but non-goal events, it remained unclear if the increased FP activity also seen for this condition reflected a) the source of top-down attentional focus, b) a consequence of conscious perception or c) resulted from effort/task difficulty involved in discriminating fleeting percepts.
Here, in the first two experiments of the current study we used a similar task to Shulman et al. (2003) . Unlike that task however, perceptual events were presented for longer intervals such that they were unambiguously conscious and had to be attended with no requirement for highly-paced, effortful search. In each trial of both experiments participants were asked to monitor a stream of highly visible 1-per-s letters for the occurrence of three pre-designated target stimuli also presented for 1 sec and in the same font/color as the nontargets, within the stream (specific digits in Experiment 1, specific letters in Experiment 2). The key question was whether conscious and attended perception of non-target letters would elicit increased FP activity. If consciousness or attended perception is necessarily linked with increased FP activity then viewing clearly visible letters, which had to be sufficiently attended to determine whether they were targets, should elicit increased FP activity. However, if goals are the key elicitors of FP activity then such letter events should elicit no FP activity or potentially, given Shulman et al.'s results, may even deactivate some FP regions. Additionally, we also looked for FP activity elicited by the beginning of the letter stream that marked the beginning of attentional search. This salient event would be highly conscious and attended, perhaps more so than the letters of attended letter stream, and yet not signal goal-attainment.
Whilst consciousness of, and attention toward, high contrast letters appearing in isolation for 1 sec against a blank screen in the same location as goal-relevant stimuli would seem unambiguous, in Experiment 1 we introduced a further check that would not inadvertently make awareness of nontargets a goal. Consciousness is often operationally defined by participants' ability to report stimuli. Accordingly we manipulated the frequency with which certain letters appeared and asked participants after the experiment and without prior warning whether they had noticed this and could report the high-frequency letters.
In Experiment 3 we examined activity elicited by salient auditory cues that had to be kept in working memory for up to 9 sec and then used to determine the correct rule for responding to the subsequent stimuli. Again the interest was in whether these events, of which consciousness and attention could be inferred by their effective use after a delay but which did not constitute goal-attainment would be linked with increased FP activity, no change from baseline or even relative FP deactivation.
Methods
Many of the methods were constant for Experiments 1e3 and are given here for brevity. Differences are covered in the relevant sections below. Experiment 1 was designed with the explicit aim mentioned here. Experiment 2 was originally designed to look for activity related to hierarchical goal completion (see Farooqui et al., 2012 for details). Experiment 3 was originally designed to look for the relation between taskrule encoding and fluid intelligence. Our participant panel has a wider fluid intelligence range in older population, hence the participant age group of this experiment was older than Experiments 1 and 2. We realized that aspects of Experiment 2 and 3 show results crucial for the current study, hence their inclusion.
Participants
Twenty-one participants (12 women; mean age, 22 ± 4 years) took part in Experiment 1, twenty-one participants (15 women; mean age, 24.5 ± 4.1 years) took part in Experiment 2 and twenty-seven participants (15 women; mean age 50 ± 6.6 years) took part in Experiment 3. All were right handed, had normal or corrected vision, were recruited from the Cognition . T1-weighted MP RAGE structural images were also acquired for all participants (slice thickness, 1.0 mm; resolution, 1.0_1.0_1.5 mm; field of view, 256 mm; 160 slices). Experimental task started after 10 "dummy" scans had been acquired. These were discarded from the general linear model to allow for T1 equilibration effects. For Experiment 3 acquisition was identical except that 16 slices were taken in an acquisition time of 1000 msec. Acquisition window was angled to include occipital, parts of temporal (specifically auditory regions) and frontal regions leaving out superior parts of frontal and parietal lobe corresponding to motor and somatosensory cortices, anterior temporal regions and inferior cerebellum. All stimuli were centered on the screen, visible from the participant's position in the scanner via a mirror mounted within the head coil.
Analysis
A total of 603 (Experiment 1), 1650 (Experiment 2), 2700 (Experiment 3) volumes were collected. They were analyzed using SPM8 (Experiments 1 and 2) and SPM12 (Experiment 3) through Automated Analysis workflow (Cusack et al., 2015) . All images were first realigned to the first image, then they were slice time-corrected and co-registered with the structural image. Finally, they were normalized to the standard MNI template, then smoothed with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel and high-pass filtered with cut-off at 90 sec (.011 Hz). Prior to normalization scans were co-registered to AC-PC. Normalization was done through unified segmentation-normalization. During the normalization stage, voxels were resampled to a size of 3 Â 3 Â 3 mm. Fixed-effects analyses were performed on each individual's data using a general linear model. Contrasts were further examined by random-effects analysis. Activation maps (threshold .05, FDR-corrected, unless specified otherwise) were visualized using MRIcron (Rorden et al., 2007) .
To look at the pattern of activity in FP regions previously linked to attention and consciousness, 10 regions of interest (ROIs) were created as spheres of 10 mm radius at coordinates that have been shown to be consistently active during attended and conscious perception (Bisenius et al., 2015; Dehaene et al., 2006; Duncan, 2006; Rees, 2007) . These are also the regions frequently seen to work in unison as multiple demands or task positive network (Dosenbach c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 e1 4 3   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64et Duncan, 2006; Fox et al., 2005) . The ROIs (in MNI space) were bilateral inferior frontal sulcus (IFS; central coordinate ± 41 23 29), bi-lateral intraparietal sulcus (IPS; ± 37 À 56 41), bilateral anterior insula extending into frontal operculum (AI/FO; ± 35 18 3), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; 0 31 24), and presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA; 0 18 50), all taken from Duncan (2006) ; bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex ROIs (APFC; 27 50 23 and À 28 51 15) were taken from Dosenbach et al. (2006) . ROIs were constructed using the MarsBaR toolbox for Statistical Parametric Mapping or SPM. Estimated data were averaged across voxels within each ROI using the MarsBaR toolbox, and the mean values were exported for analysis using SPSS.
3.
Experiment 1 In each trial ( Fig. 1 ) participants were first shown a 3-digit number (e.g., '517' presented for 1 sec). Participants were told to sequentially search for and detect these digits in the sequence of letters to follow. After a jittered interval of 1e7 sec (mean 3 sec) a centered blue outline square appeared (white interior, 2.5 visual angle), and a stream of letters, presented one at a time (on for 1 sec, black font on white background, vertical visual angle 2 ), appeared in it. On detecting the first target, T1 ('5'), participants pressed their right index finger button, and started searching for the second target, T2 ('1') and on its detection pressed the button under their right middle finger, and started searching for the third target, T3 ('7') for which they would press their right ring finger button. T1 and T2 always occurred whilst T3 only occurred on 50% of trials, when the letter stream would terminate without the T3 appearing. Crucially, half of the search periods leading up to T1 and T3 (1st and 3rd phases) were blank (no letters appeared) with participants simply viewing the unchanging blue square until the target digit appeared. The period between T1 and T2 (2nd search phase) always involved searching through a letter stream. The trial episode thus consisted of three phases leading up to the detection of the three targets, the first and third of which could either be a letter search phase or a blank passive wait phase, with the second always a letter search phase. The length of the first phase and the third phase (whether lettered or blank) varied between 2 and 22 sec, and that of the second phase between 2 and 7 sec, with these intervals always summing to 30 sec.
To emphasize that the goal was to detect all 3 digits, participants scored a point only for fast accurate responses to all three. Responses to only two targets would not score even if the final digit never occurred, and any response to a nontarget or failure to respond to a target would lose a point. The current score was displayed at the end of each trial for 1 sec. The next trial began after a variable inter-trial interval of 2e7 sec.
Non-target letters were selected in a quasi-random manner such that a particular letter ('X' or 'Y') was presented with a higher probability (.2, compared to .03 for other letters). After the experimental session, without prior warning, participants were asked about the most frequently appearing letter. If unable to answer they were asked to choose the most frequently appearing letter from 4 presented candidates.
Experiment 1 analysis
We undertook two kinds of analysis. In the first Letter and blank phases were modeled with epoch regressors while target, cues and score events were modeled as event regressors. These were convolved with a single basis function Fig. 1 e Experiment 1. Trials began with the presentation of a cue showing the sequence of 3 digits to be sequentially detected in the upcoming search episode. Search started after a jittered gap of 1e7 sec and was marked by the appearance of a blue square, which either remained blank during blank phases or contained a series of letters (letter phases) each appearing for 1 sec with no gap between consecutive letters. Targets were presented in identical conditions to the letters. Participants made button press responses on detecting the correct target. Note that in the above figure the third phase of (b) is blank.
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In the second analysis twenty seconds of activity following the beginning of the trial episode were modeled with ten 2 sec long finite impulse regressors (FIRs; Glover 1999). This allowed us to estimate the activity in every voxel across these ten time bins following the onset of the episode. Accordingly a detailed time course of activity could be constructed without assumptions about the shape of neural activity or of the consequent hemodynamic response. Letter and blank phases were separately modeled. Targets and cue were modeled as events of no duration and convolved with the HRF.
Experiment 1 results
Most participants exceeded 97% (average 98.2 ± .3) with a mean reaction time of 410 ± 10 msec. Post experiment all participants correctly selected the most frequently presented letter from a choice of 4 (with 81% able to name it spontaneously before the choices were offered). Previous research has linked conscious awareness of stimuli with increased and more widespread FP activity. However, the whole brain contrast comparing activity during letter and blank periods (both corresponding to phase 3) showed significant differences only in occipital regions (hot regions in Fig. 2 ), wherein it extended from the occipital pole (BA 17) laterally through BA 18, 19 and 37 (the lateral occipital complex, LOC; Grill-Spector et al., 2001) . Small clusters of significance were seen subcortically in head of caudate and posterior thalamus.
The reverse contrast (cool regions in Fig. 2) showed that activity during the blank waiting periods was greater than for letters in widespread brain regions including right FP cortices, medial occipital and parietal regions (Calcarine sulcus, lingual gyrus, cuneus and precuneus), temporo-parietal junction, inferior parietal lobule. This not only suggests that activity in FP regions previously linked to attention and consciousness was no greater during attentive viewing of a stream of clearly visible, fixated letters than during viewing of a constant blank screen but also that such attended and conscious search deactivated these FP regions.
When letters and blank periods corresponding to the first phase were compared in whole brain analysis, increased activity linked with letters was only observed in the same occipital regions as the previous analysis. However, decreasing the threshold of analysis to uncorrected p < .01 showed two additional frontal areas (left premotor and IFS, and left operculum) and a parietal cluster (in and around left IPS). However, as the next analysis shows, even these regions did not increase their activity in response to letters.
An FIR analysis (plots averaged across all subjects shown in Fig. 3 ) of the time-course of 20 sec of activity following the onset of the margin (indicating the beginning of the search/blank waiting period) showed early deactivation that reached a nadir at around 10 sec in all FP regions. Note that the onset of margins marking the beginning of search is itself a behaviorally salient event likely to be both conscious and attended. It nonetheless elicited a strong deactivation the downward phase of which continued for 10e12 sec (i.e., for the first 10 letters). This FP response was in sharp contrast to visual regions in which activity increased in response to the letters but not to the blank waiting period.
This pattern of activity also showed that the results cannot be explained in terms of repetition suppression (fMRI adaptation) which can occur with repeated viewing of the same stimulus category. The expected time course from such an effect would be an initial activation that decreases with subsequent repetitions (Barron, Garvert, & Behrens, 2016; Larsson et al., 2016) . This seems to have occurred in the lateral occipital complex (inset Fig. 3 ) where early letter presentation elicited strong initial activity that, after peaking at 10 sec, started to gradually decrease. In sharp contrast to this, in FP regions the early letter sequence elicited a deactivation, which after reaching a nadir at 10 sec, returned to baseline.
3.3.
Experiment 1 discussion and rationale for Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 we attempted to recreate an example of 'everyday' conscious perception using letter stimuli that had to be attended and perceived for task execution but whose perception was not the goal. Far from activating FP regions, these letters deactivated these regions. It is therefore possible that the increased FP activity linked with consciousness in previous NCC studies reflects goal attainment unwittingly linked to conscious perception in those experiment designs rather than conscious perception per se.
It could be argued that, despite participants' accuracy in post-test recall, the letters in Experiment 1 were not wellattended because of the ease with which digits can be distinguished. In Experiment 2 we therefore examined whether similar patterns would be apparent when participants had to identify a letter targets among streams of other letters, that is where such category-level filtering could not occur. While Experiment 1 compared activity elicited by letter events with equivalent blank periods, Experiment 2 compared the activity elicited by attended versus unattended letter events.
Experiment 2
At the outset of each trial (Fig. 4 ) a three-letter sequence (e.g., 'DAT') was shown for 3.5 sec indicating the sequence of targets for which the participants were to search within the subsequent letter stream. Following a jittered gap of 1e5 sec, a sequence of 40 sequential single letters began (1/sec, white on a black background, vertical 2 ). Participants were asked to first monitor for the 1st target ('D'), then, at its detection, for the 2nd ('A'), and then the third ('T'). After detecting all three targets participants stopped their search and passively waited for the letter stream to end, at which time they saw a probe (e.g., DAT?) to which they were to respond yes/no (all letters present vs one or more absent) using buttons located under the index and middle finger of the right hand. No specific instruction was given to participants regarding what they should do between the last target and the end of the sequence but the expectation, given the continued presentation of letters, the absence of anything else to look at and the requirement to respond to the subsequent probe, was that they would be passively viewed. This was not however monitored using eye-tracking. A variable inter-trial interval of 2e7 sec preceded the next trial. In 50% of trials all 3 targets appeared, whilst 0, 1 or 2 appeared in the remainder (7, 18 and 25% respectively). The inter-target interval within a trial varied randomly between 2 and 32 sec. All stimuli were centered on the screen. Participants first learned the task in a 10 min pre-scan practice session and then proceeded to the 1 h scanning session of divided into three separate 20 trial scanning runs.
Experiment 2 analysis
In the first analysis we modeled the entire 40 sec letter sequence with a set of twenty 2 sec long finite impulse regressors (FIR) starting from its onset. Target events were separately modeled with eight 2 sec long FIRs. In the second analysis we contrasted the activity when the letter sequence was attended, i.e., before the detection of the final target, to that when the search was complete i.e., after T3 had been detected. For this, the three search periods (to T1, from T1 to T2 and from T2 to T3) and the post-completion period were modeled with separate epoch regressors, while target events were modeled as events of no duration. These regressors were convolved with HRF. In both analyses, the cue and the probe were modeled using epoch regressors of width equal to their durations and Fig. 2 e Experiment 1. Letter versus Blank during phase 3. Hotter and cooler regions were more and less active respectively during the search through the letter sequence than during the passive wait in front of the blank screen. ROI analysis confirmed that, in most FP regions previously associated with consciousness and attention, blank phases elicited greater activity, suggesting that the presence of letters deactivated these regions. y-axes here and in subsequent graphs represent the parameter estimates obtained from the general linear model. Error bars here and in subsequent graphs represent 95% confidence intervals.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 e1 4 6   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 convolved with the HRF. Movement parameters and block means were included as covariates of no interest. Parameter estimates for each regressor were calculated from the leastsquares fit of the model to the data, and (in the second analysis) estimates for individual participants were entered into a random effects group analysis. Results were FDR corrected (<.05).
Experiment 2 results
Mean accuracy in reporting presence/absence of pre-specified 3-letter sequence was 96.1% (±2.7) with a RT of 770 msec. Target-letter presentation elicited strong activity in all FP regions with goal completion (T3) eliciting higher and more widespread activity than earlier targets (colored plots in Fig. 5 ; see Farooqui et al., 2012 for a detailed analysis). Our concern here however was the activity elicited by the non-target events. Fig. 5 shows the FIR time-series from the beginning of the letter stream over the next 40 sec averaged across all subjects. As in Experiment 1, in spite of its salience the event that marked the beginning of visual search corresponded to a deactivation of all FP regions relative to the period before search. The elicited deactivation was sustained, with its downward phase continuing for up to 14 sec before returning gradually to the baseline toward the end of the letter sequence. This additionally showed that the sequential perception of 40 letter events did not activate any of these regions above the level observed before the onset of the lettersequence. The latter would correspond to the estimates of activity represented by the first FIR because of the temporal lag inherent in the BOLD response.
We then looked for regions that deactivated in response to the beginning of the visual search, an event likely to be both salient and conscious. A whole brain contrast examined regions in which activity during the 1st FIR (capturing activity in the initial 0e2 sec) was higher than the 5th FIR (capturing activity at 8e10 sec into the stream). This would reveal brain regions that had deactivated in response to the beginning of the letter stream. This was significant in all cortical regions barring some isolated islands corresponding to parts of occipital pole, inferior and superior division of Fig. 3 e Experiment 1. Letter versus Blank during phase 1. Regions that elicited greater activity during the search through the letter sequence was limited to lateral occipital regions with additional frontal and parietal clusters appearing at uncorrected thresholds. However, activity time-course of these as well as other FP regions showed a deactivation beginning with the onset of the visual search, unlike lateral occipital regions. Note that the contrast Letter > Blank (hot) is being shown at uncorrected p < .05.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 e1 4 7   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 Fig. 4 e Experiment 2. Trials began with a three-letter cue. The three letters were to be covertly detected, in the correct order, in the ensuing letter stream. After all three had been detected, search stopped and subjects waited for the letter stream to end, at which point a probe appeared asking if all three targets had appeared. In half of the trials all three targets did not appear and the search continued till the end of the sequence. The total length of the letter sequence was constant at 40 letters presented at the rate of 1/sec (on for 900 msec). The length of the three searches and of the passive wait varied from 2 to 32 sec. Fig. 5 e Experiment 2. Black plots show the estimated activity during the 40 sec of letter sequence presentations. Note that the start of the sequence was accompanied by widespread deactivation that started returning toward the baseline after 12e14 sec. In contrast targets elicited strong activity (red: T3, green: T2, blue: T1). Whole brain render shows regions where the onset of visual search elicited a deactivation (cool) and activation (hot). Note that the contrast looking for increase in activity (hot) is being shown at uncorrected p < .05. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 lateral occipital complex and central sulcus (Fig. 5) . The onset of the letter stream, corresponding to the beginning of the visual search e an event very likely to be extremely salient and conscious e deactivated almost the entire cortex.
In this experiment, letter stream continued to be presented after T3, i.e., when the goal for that trial was complete and the attentional search had stopped. Whilst we anticipated that participants would continue to view the post final target letter stream (there being little else to look at) it is possible that they drifted or closed their eyes. While this is unlikely given prompt responses to the subsequent probe (most < 1 sec, with no unanswered probe), either way it is reasonable to assume that attention to these letters would be reduced compared with the period of active attended search. However, the only region where activity was higher during attentional search than that during subsequent passive wait was in the occipital pole and, when a very liberal p < .05 (uncorrected) threshold was adopted, in a small cluster in right intraparietal sulcus (Fig. 6) . In contrast, a very widespread set of regions that included both cognitive control and default mode related FP regions showed greater activity during the passive wait compared with the attended search.
4.3.
Experiment 2 discussion and rationale for Experiment 3
Experiment 2 thus replicated Experiment 1 in showing FP deactivation during conscious and attentive perception of non-target letters. While this deactivation in Experiment 1 was relative to passively viewing a constant blank screen, in Experiment 2 this was relative to passively viewing a sequence of letters. Additionally, in both experiments the salient event marking the beginning of letter sequence deactivated FP regions.
Perceptual events we studied in Experiments 1 and 2 were not to be maintained in working memory across long durations. In Experiment 3 we looked at conscious, salient and attended cues that had to be maintained in working memory for up to 9 sec before rules signaled by them could be enacted. In other words cues were instrumental to goal completion but did not constitute goal completion. As with the previous experiments it was highly likely that the auditory cue would be Fig. 6 e Experiment 2. 'Cooler' regions in the whole brain render were more active during rest following the search than during search, while 'hotter' regions were more active during the search ('hotter' regions are displayed at uncorrected threshold of p < .05). Plots show that all FP regions deactivated during the search compared to the rest period.
consciously perceived and, due to its inherent properties and goal-relevance, attended. A further check was afforded by participants' accuracy in applying the signaled rule up to 9 sec later. The critical question was whether awareness, attention and maintenance of this non-goal completing cue would also be accompanied by FP activation.
Experiment 3
In each trial (Fig. 7) participants first viewed a fixation cross whilst waiting for one of 4 spoken auditory cues ("P1", "P2", "F1" or "F2"). This disambiguated which of 4 pre-learned rules to apply to subsequent stimuli. After a variable wait of 1.5e9.0 sec the visual stimuli appeared. They consisted of a picture of a face above and of a place/scene below fixation, or vice versa. Categorization rules were as follows: P1 e categorize the scene as indoors or outdoors; P2 e categorize the place as indoor-commercial, indoor-non-commercial, outdoorcommercial or outdoor-non-commercial; F1 e face as male or female; F2 e face as young-male, old-male, young-female or old-female. Two category discriminations (P1 and F1) were made with a single button push with the index or 2nd finger of the right hand on underlying keys, 4-category conjunction discriminations were made using a single button push of one of 4 keys underlying fingers 1e4 of the right hand. After responses, a change in the color of the fixation-cross signaled the end of the trial. The next cue followed after a random interval of 3e12 sec. Cue volume was set to be comfortable but clearly audible. Whilst otherwise identical to the other trials, on 20% a random wait rather than the stimuli followed the cue. This was to help separate activity related to the cue from that to the stimuli. We modeled the period of 10 sec following the cue with ten 1 sec long FIRs. Unlike the cue, the response coincided with the completion of the task goal. We likewise modeled the 10 sec period following the response with ten FIRs. Other aspects of the analysis were similar to Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 3 results
Mean categorization accuracy was 89.3% (±1.1) and RT was 2660 msec (±241) from stimulus onset. Blue plots in Fig. 8 show the estimates of activity following the cue. As is evident, increased activity was seen only in auditory (A1) and not FP regions. In contrast, the response to the stimuli e marking the completion of the goal e elicited widespread FP activity (red plots). Next, to capture any region where cue perception elicited increased activity we contrasted the estimates of activity between the first 2 sec (captured by the 1st two FIR regressors) and the 4e5 sec (captured by 4th and 5th FIR regressors) following the cue for each voxel. This would capture the upstroke of activation if it were elicited by the cue, whereby the activity will be higher at 4e5 sec than 1e2 sec following the cue. However, significant voxels were limited to temporal auditory regions (brain render in Fig. 8 ; results shown at uncorrected p < .05). Thus, increased FP activity, clearly apparent for goal completion, was undetectable for highly salient cues that had to be remembered for extended intervals and which were used for very high levels of stimulus categorization performance.
General discussion
To summarize, in Experiments 1 and 2, attended and conscious perception of highly visible non-target letters resulted in widespread FP deactivation compared to the baseline of passively waiting in front of a blank screen (Experiment 1) and passively seeing letter presentations stream by (Experiment 2). Furthermore, in both experiments the event marking the beginning of the visual search e an event likely to be both highly salient and attended e elicited a long lasting deactivation compared to the pre-search waiting period in very widespread FP regions. In Experiment 3, perception of a salient cue that was to be remembered for up Fig. 7 e Experiment 3. Trials began with an auditory cue conveying the rule to be used in categorizing the relevant picture in the visual stimuli to follow (see text). Four potential rules were cued by four different cues. After the response to these stimuli fixation-cross color changed signaling the beginning of inter-trial period. In 20% of trials the visual stimuli did not appear, and the auditory cue and the wait for the visual stimuli were directly followed by a change in color of the fixation cross signaling the end of the trial.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 e1 4 10   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 to 9 sec and subsequently used to respond to the stimulus did not activate any such region. Across all experiments these events only elicited localized activity in their respective sensory cortices. Past studies have linked widespread increase in activity involving FP cortices with conscious perception. However, the task in such studies has typically involved attempting to detect fleeting, degraded and ambiguous stimuli and reporting that detection. Not only does this limit the potential generality of the findings to everyday notions of consciousness where conscious perception per se is rarely the goal and is seldom accompanied by explicit metacognitive reports, it also leaves it unclear if the FP activity is related to the demanding perception, goal completion or introspective reporting. Recent studies have suggested that these issues may have been partial confounds in this purported link, and have shown decreased frontal activity when perceptual difficulty is controlled for (e.g., Knapen et al., 2011) or self-reports are removed (e.g., Frassle et al., 2014) . None of these findings however negate the accounts that see at least some increased FP activity as integral to conscious perception (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Odegaard et al., 2017) , because in most such studies there nonetheless was a reduced but significant foci of FP activation (e.g., Frassle et al., 2014) . A series of studies looking at neural responses to unattended and task irrelevant stimuli are also limited in ruling out a FP e consciousness link (Pitts et al., 2014; Scholte et al., 2006; Tse et al., 2005) . The activity elicited by such stimuli is likely to be feeble, making their absence of evidence in the context of an ongoing demanding task, an uncertain evidence of absence (e.g., Odegaard et al., 2017) .
Here we showed that perception of easily visible, attended and task relevant events that were instrumental for goal completion, far from activating, deactivated widespread FP regions, thus negating a key prediction of theories that require increase in FP activity for conscious perception.
It might be objected that the current studies had no 'unconscious' condition; participants were always conscious of some visual percept and hence there was no contrast that could reveal NCC. This is an inherent problem for the field: During the 'unconscious' trials of all previous studies participants were always perceptually aware of something e.g., the masking stimuli in visual masking, ongoing percept in binocular rivalry studies, the computer monitor and so on (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Knapen et al., 2011; Lau & Passingham, 2007) . The basis of contrast in these studies was the additional phenomenal content in the conscious compared to 'unconscious' trials, e.g., in masking studies participants were conscious of the stimuli in addition to the mask. In the current experiments we did the same manipulation but with non-goal perceptual events. For example, during the blank waiting period in Experiment 1 participants only perceived the Fig. 8 e Experiment 3. Blue plots show the average estimate of activity elicited by the auditory cues. Note that these cues only activated auditory regions. In contrast, the response event (red plots) activated all FP regions. In the brain render the hot and cold colors show regions where the BOLD activity increased and decreased across initial 5 sec following cue perception. The highlighted bracket shows the scanning window.
white background but in the letter search condition they additionally perceived a series of numerous letters in addition to this background. Additionally, we looked at the time course of activity elicited by some perceptually salient task events e.g., the event beginning the visual search. If increased FP activity necessarily follows conscious phenomenon then the perception of these events should increase such activity. In both scenarios we found deactivations in those very same FP regions previously associated with consciousness and attention. In Experiment 2, we additionally showed that even attending to a sequence of non-goal but visible letters elicited deactivation. In contrast to FP regions all these events robustly activated the sensory cortices of their modality.
If increased FP activity is not a marker of conscious perception when such perception does not complete a goal, do our findings reveal any markers of this, perhaps more everyday form, of conscious perception? In all experiments, increased activity was observed only in the relevant sensory regions. With due caveats regarding fMRI sensitivity, it is possible that there is no specialized activity differentiating conscious from unconscious perception; regions engaged in perceptual/task related processing may also distinguish consciousness, particularly when detection is relatively straightforward and automatic. Convergent with this, Moutoussis and Zeki (2002) reported that easy to process conscious stimuli only activated visual cortical regions while ambiguous and rivalrous nonconscious stimuli resulted in widespread FP activity. Similarly, Eriksson et al. (2008) reported widespread FP activity for initially difficult to see pictures that diminished sharply with practice. Amting et al. (2010) , using a binocular rivalry paradigm, showed that fearful facial expressions tended to reach conscious awareness when pitted against disgusted or neutral expressions but elicited significantly lower levels of FP activity. Turning to neuropsychology and potential frontal NCC, there was no evidence that bilateral frontal lobotomy robbed patients of conscious perception (Fleming and Dully, 2008; Miller, 1967) except possibly under difficult circumstances in which stimuli were fleeting and degraded (Del Cul et al., 2009) .
It may be claimed that the non-goal perceptual events in these experiments were not really attended. This seems implausible. After all what differentiated the perception of these events from task-irrelevant perceptions e visual periphery, scanner noise, numerous ongoing somatic sensations? How in Experiment 2 was the perception of letter stream before search completion different from after search completion? The letters had to be individually focused upon and differentiated from the current target. In Experiment 1 the most frequently appearing non-target could be accurately recalled. Further, the onset of the letter stream is likely to be highly salient because of the change in cognition (i.e., beginning of search) that it heralds. Lastly, the cues in Experiment 3 not only had to be attentively perceived against the background scanner noise, but also kept in working memory across time.
Whilst the relationship between neural activity and reductions in MRI BOLD signal remains unclear (Mishra et al., 2011) , such deactivations are frequently reported. Most pertinent to the current discussion, the deactivation of a set of default mode 'task-negative' FP regions in the presence concurrent activation of other attention/control related 'task-positive' FP regions has been frequently interpreted as reflecting suppression of internal thoughts, day-dreams etc. during engagement with an external task (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Fox et al., 2005; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman, Astafiev, McAvoy, d'Avossa, & Corbetta, 2007 , 2003 . In Experiments 1 and 2 deactivations were seen in all major FP regions (both 'task-positive' and 'task-negative') without any concomitant activation in any of the classic 'task-positive' FP regions whose activity has been previously linked with consciousness. By extension from the above argument, such deactivation may reflect suppression of activity that would be counterproductive to the current goal. This is strongly suggested, for example, by the cessation of deactivation in Experiment 2 after presentation of the final target (when interference with the current goal should no longer be problematic).
Though this may seem contrary to a raft of findings reporting FP activation during attentive search, an intriguing possibility is that it occurred in this case because the nontargets were so salient; so conscious. Attention, rather than being a non-specific amplifier of incoming information, may be an allocator of information to relevant neural regions whilst excluding information from currently task-irrelevant regions. Hence, if individual letter events did not need to be represented in FP cortices for their identification and rejection, then they may be actively excluded from such regions.
There are precedents for such an effect. Hickey et al. (2009 ), Gasper et al. (2014 , Moher et al. (2015) and Gaspelin et al. (2015) have all reported the effect of salient ('attention grabbing') distractors causing less interference than unobtrusive equivalents on an ongoing task. There is also evidence in support of the corollary, that less visible/subliminal events may be less efficiently excluded from goal-directed processes. For example, participants can be better at learning associations between subliminal/incidental events than those that are more salient (Farooqui & Manly, 2015; Tsushima et al., 2008 Tsushima et al., , 2006 Watanabe et al., 2001) . Similarly, subliminal primes may have larger effects than their consciously perceived equivalents even when that influence is detrimental to current goals (Lau & Passingham, 2007; Lin & Murray, 2015; Manly et al., 2014; Zhou & Davis, 2012) .
While we argue that ongoing FP activity is not needed for identifying and rejecting non-targets, it is not a necessary implication that FP regions are uninvolved in identifying and rejecting non-targets. For example, rather than being involved in identifying and rejecting non-targets individually, these regions may be required to establish the appropriate attentional set that automatizes the identification and rejection of individual non-targets (see Hommel, 2000; Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012; Mongillo & Tsodyks, 2008; Muhle-Karbe et al., 2016; Stokes et al., 2013 for related ideas).
Conclusions
In summary the current studies examined whether FP activity highlighted in previous studies using difficult-to-perceive stimuli as a potential signature of conscious awareness may be better conceived of as reflecting goal-attainment in detecting those stimuli. To do this we used highly visible, easy to perceive perceptual events that were delinked from participants' current goal. Despite evidence that participants c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 e1 4 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 were indeed aware of these stimuli, no increased FP activity was observed. The presence of robust FP activity associated with goal-attainment in the same experiments is both consistent with the confound argument and suggests that accounts of our failure to demonstrate FP activity NCC based on insufficient power are unlikely. However, our findings were not simply negative. Highly significant FP deactivation was observed for conscious, task relevant, non-goal events that were instrumental for goal completion. Whilst much in the relationship between fMRI deactivation and neural processes remains to be explored, the results are consistent with highly efficient goal-directed management of FP activity leading to active suppression of responses to conscious but potentially goal-interfering stimuli.
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